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Abstract
In this paper we show that there is a formal equivalence  between the theory of tariffs in
international  trade theory and the basic theory of income taxation in u ri-pt"  neoclassical  model
that allows.for household production.  Many insights from international trade theory can thus
illuminate  important  aspects  of public finance,  Income taxes,  which are like international  tariff
wars, dramatically reduce specialization within an economy. Income taxes (tariffs)  hurt low
income people (small countries) more than high income people (large countries).  As in tariff
theory  the costs of income taxes are small only if they succeld in rising  ."u"nu";  thus it really
hurts an T9l9my  to be on the downward portion of the tax revenue (Iaffer)  curve.  Income
taxes (tariffs)  have more of a negative welfare impact the larger is the value-of market income
(trade) compared  to total production  (GDp) or, that is, the riore heterogeneous  the society.
'We thank Avinash Dixit  for helpful comments and suggestions.  The views expressed  in this
paper  do not necessarily  reflect  those  of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas  or the Federal  Reserve
Svstem.Income Taxes as Reciprocal Tariffs
The value of home production  (excluding  leisure)  equals  about  one-third of measured
output  (Eisner, 1989,  p-..56).  .  Although the.partial,equilibrium  analysis  of.household  production
has been subject to considerable analysis,  beginning with Becker (1965), the general equilibrium
treatment of household  production  and taxation  has  received  very litfle attention. Boskin (1975)
uses  a two-sector  model in which the household  sector  and the market sector  both use  capital
and labor, but labor is untaxed  in the household  sector  and  capital  is lightly taxed. Apps (1981)
has  used  the analogl between  models  of household  production  and tariff theory to explore  issues
involving inequality between tlte sexes. Sandmo (1990) examines  optimum tax structures ln a
Beckerian-style model of household production, but employs  the assumption that households
must make market purchases.
There is really no difference between the neoclassical  treatment of home production in
international trade theory and household  production  in the domestic  economy. The purpose  of
this paper is to show the formal equivalence  between the theory of tariffs in international  trade
and the basic theory of income taxation in a simple model of household production. Insights
ftom  trade theory may thus illuminate public finance and, perhaps, create a dialogue between
these  two venerable  branches  of economics.  Unlike Apps (1981),  Boskin (1975)  and Sandmo
(1990),  we show  that with sufficient  taxation  the entire output of the economy  can  be reduced  to
household  production. We take the point of view  that each  agent  can  produce  an array of
goods,  some  of which are imported and some  of which are exported, Which goods  are
"exported" or "imported" by the individual is determined by comparative advantage.  With
household  production,  some  income  is earned  that is nontaxable.  In the usual  proof of
equivalence between sales  taxes and income taxes  it is assumed  that all consumption orproduction is taxed.t  Thus, in effect, we show the equivalence  of sales  taxes and income taxes
when there is home production,
The advantage  of our formulation  is that we can highlight how taxes directly interfere
with the division of labor. As pointed out by Sandmo,  once  household  production  is recogrized
production efficiency is no longer feasible because  ;r*"*  oo households  are in fact tariffs on
their trade with the rest of the economy."  (Sandmo,  1990,  p. 89).  It is well-known,  of course,
that income taxes shift production from market work to home production.  For example,
Sweden,  a country with one of the highest marginal income tax rates in the world, is also a
leader in time spent doing home improvements. Swedish  men averaged  over 4 hours per week
' doing home improvement  activities  in 1984. In contrast,  men in the United States  averaged  2.8
hours and Japanese  men less  than I hour (Juster  and Stafford,  1991). The effect  of taxes  on the
division of labor has been succinctly stated by the distinguished trade theorist, Ivor Pearce
(re17):
"The striking growth of do-it-yourself activity in recent years is neither an accident
nor a change in basic preferences. Tax is avoided on work for self.  Work for an
employer is heavily taxed.  The cheapest  way to get something done is to do it
yourself, contrary to the principle of the division of labour on which our high
present  standards  of living depend. The whole structure  of industry  is deeply
affected  (Pearce,  1977,  pp. 105-106)."
Once it is realized that income taxes are just like tariffs, the entire machinery of tariff
theory can be brought into play. Income  taxes  (tariffs) hurt low income  people  (small countries)
more than high income people (large countries).  Income taxes,  which are like international
'  See  Mieszkowski  (1967,  p. 251)  for a lucid statement  of the equivalence  between.income
taxes  and sales  taxes  in a world without home  production.tariff  wars, dramatically reduce specialization within an economy. As in tariff  theory, the costs
of  income taxes are small only if they succeed  in raising revenue; thus it  really hurts an
economy  to be on the downward  portion of the tax revenue  (Laffer) curve.  Income taxes
(tariffs)  should have more of a negative impact on welfare the larger is the value of market
income (trade) compared  to total production  (GDP) or, rhat is, the more heterogeneous  the
societv.
I.  Income Tax Theory
Consider  two agents,  or households,  1 and  2, producing  two goods,  1 and 2.  I-et x I and
c;,denote  the output and consumption  of good  j by household  i has  the utility function
u'(cr',  cj),  (1)
and its production  transformation  function  is
Tt(x,t,  x|)  = Q.  (2)
We let MRS' = u; / ui and MRTI  = -fi I Ti denote  the appropriate  marginal  rates  of
substitution  or transformation  in consumption  and production.  The market price of good 2 in
terms of good 1 is p.  Household  i sells  good  i and  buys  good  j (i + j).
Taxing household production or consumption is simply not possible.  As a result, the
government can only impose a sales  tax (duty) or an income tax on transactions with the market.
We now examine the effects of and income tax r which levied ad valorem on each household as
a proportion  of its net dollar sales. Net dollar sales  are market income.  As a benchmark for
the analysis,  we assume  that all income tax receipts, Flj , are directly rebated back to each
household  by the amount  paid to the government,  but the household  treats this as a lump-sum
amount  independent  of any decisions  it might make. This assumptions  allows  us to abstractfrom  the redistributive  effects of fiscal policy and is a convienent starting point for evaluating
income taxes.
We present the model in detail because  this may be an unfamiliar formulation  of income
tax theory. The budget  constraints  of each  household  are:
R'  + (r,r  -c,1)(1r.) =  p(") -xj)
ni  * @i  - c|)p(t-r) = (ri - xil.
Household 1 chooses  (xj, c]) to maximize the Lagrangian
9'  =  a'(.)  * 1T(.) * p[Rr + (rl  - c)(tt)-p(c]  - x])1,
which  yields the frst  order conditions
MRt'=  MRT.  =p/(l-r).
Household  2 chooses  production  and  consumption  to maximize
g'  = u"(,) * LT"(.) * llR'  * (xi - c)p(t.t)-(ri  - r1)1,
yielding
MRS2=14p72=p(tt).
The remaining  equations  are the transformation  function (2) and market clearing:
2,c| = \pi  .






n,l =r(.trr -crt) (8)Ri =  rp(xi - c).  (e)
Substituting  (8) and (9) into (3) and (4), respectively,  yields  the tax-free  budget  constraints
tr' * prj  = cri +  pcl,  (10)
Equations  (2), (5), (6), (7), and (10) consist  of nine equations  and nine variables  for
determining for the levels of household production, consumption, and p.
IL  Tariff  Theory
This section  summarizes  the traditional theory  of tariffs (see  Jones,  1969;  Ruffin, 1979)
in a form that is useful for comparison with income tax theory.
Countries 1 and 2 produce goods 1 and 2.  Country i exports good i.  The world price of
good 2 in terms of good 1 is p.  The domestic  relative  price of good  2 is pi.  Country i imposes
the ad valorem tariff rate ti on the point-of-origin  price (Lerner, 1936). Since  country 1 imports
good 2, the domestic price of good 2 is higher than the foreign price:
pr =  p(l  + tt).  (11)
Since country 2 exports good 2, the domestic relative price is lower than the world price:
p'  =p/(1 +t\.  Q2)
Renaming households as countries we cim use the same  notation as before for describing utility
in country i and production possibilities.
We make the usual assumption in tariff  theory that all tax revenues  are redistributed in
lump-sum form  to consumers. We could proceed as before, but we simply note that this
assumption is automatically captured if the appropriate rates of substitution or transformationare set equal to the domestic price ratio and the value of exports equal the value of imports at
world prices or, equivalently, the value of production equals the value of consumption at world
prices. Thus,  the fundamental  equations  of tariff theory  are:
xrt + pxri  = cri + pci
MRSI  =74p7t -p(l  +tt)
MRS'=MRTZ=p/(7+t')
zpi  =  2ri






Equation  (13) describes  the spending  constraints,  equations  (14) and (15) set out the private
optimization  conditions,  equation  (16) gives  the market clearing  conditions,  and equation  (17)
relates  the supply  constraints.  There are nine independent  equations  [two each  for (13), (14),
(15), and (17)l to solve  for the nine  variables.
Table I compares the theory of income taxation with the theory of tariffs.  It is obvious
that they are formally  equivalent provided
(1 +  t') = 1/(1 - r).  (18)
Of course, the theory of tariffs can be interpreted as the theory of sales taxation if
"countries" are interpreted  as "households." Thus, we have proven that sales  taxes are equivalent
to income taxes even in the presence  of household production.
Income taxes work heavily against home production because  they act like reciprocal
tariffs: on each  "country"  or "household"  is imposed  the same  duty or tariff rate, Table 2 uses
equation (18) to show the reciprocal tariff  equivalents to different income tax rates.  While a 10percent  income  tax is the same  is like a 11  percent  reciprocal  tariff, a modest  income  tax of
33.33  per cent is like a reciprocal  tariff of 50 percent. A 50 percent  income  tax is like a 100
percent  tariff!  This suggests  rather large  anti-specialization  effects  of income  taxation. Indeed,
income taxes  are the domestic  counterpart  of international  tariff wars.
III.  Welfare
In this section, we analyze the welfare implications of income taxes in the simple way
economists examine tariff  theory (see Jones, 1969), As a benchmark for the analysis,  we
maintain the assumption that all income tax receipts are directly rebated back to each household
by the amount paid to the government.  Let  Ej = c|  - 4j be household  i,s excess  demand  for
good  j.  Use p' = MRS' = MRT  to denote  household  i's opportunity  cost  of good 2. Household
i's change in real income is defined as
4tt  = 4srt  +  ptdc;.  (19)
Differentiating the budget  constraint  (10),  using  (19),  and noting that along  the production
transformation curve dxi + ptdx; = 0, we obtain
dy'=(p'-p)dE,'-E;dp. (20)
If household  i is a net buyer of good  2 (i.e.,  imports  good  2 because  p' > p), then the change  in
welfare is sirnply its personal dividend or profit,  (p' - p)dE,r, on extra purchases  minus the
increase  in the cost of its old purchases,  Eirdp.
Several important welfare implications of income taxes  can be derived from this
relationship.  The first, and perhaps most straightforward result, is that income taxes  will have
more of a negative impact on welfare the larger is the value of market income or, that is, the
more heterogeneous the society. The more heterogeneous  the society, the larger will be thegains  from trade (which means  larger excess  demands,  Err). Since  (p'- p) = -rp, from equation
(20) we can see that, for a given income tax, larger excess  demands  (dE', > 0) will imply a larger
welfare loss.
Another  important  implication is that an equal change  in income taxes across  all
households will not necessarily  uff"ct  everyone  in the same  manner.  These differential  effects
can occur  because  a change  in the income  tax rate, r, has  an ambiguous  effect on the terms of
trade, p.  As income taxes are increased,  the terms of trade changes  are ambiguous because  the
offer curves of both households  shift in the same  inward direction.  If households are not
identically different in terms of their production possibilities and preferences,  then the terms of
tradg  p, w,ill change as the offer curves shift inward at different rates.
Indeed, when households  are not identically different, some households  will experience
an improvement in their terms of trade and, hence,  will find their welfare increasing over a
range  of income taxes. In other words,  just as  a large  country  can  gain at the expense  of a small
country by imposing an optimal tariff  to improve its terms of trade, here some households may
gain at the expense  of other households.  Income  taxes  are like a government  sponsored  tit-for-
tat tariff war between  households.  The proof of this proposition  is rather straightforward.
Starting  from zero income  taxes,  (pi- p)=0, equation  (20) shows  us that an improvement  in the
terms of trade for household  i (dp<0 and E,  > 0 or,  dp>0 and Eir<0) will enhance  its weHare
dY'l.n=-E;dpro.
And, working backwards  from autarky, we see that welfare is increasing as taxes are reduced.
4'14*=@'-PYE|>0.
Or, in other words, welfare is falling as we increase taxes and approach autarky.  Consequently,
since welfare is increasing as income taxes are raised above z€ro, but welfare is falling as incometaxes approach autarky levels, there must be an optimal income tax rate (for housholds with
improving terms of trade) between autarky and free trade.  Unlike  a unilateral optimal tariff
argument, however, where a large country can gain at the expense  of a small country, here the
country as a whole is made  worse  off because  the terms of trade improvement  for some
households  is more than offset  by the terms  of trade  loss  to the other households  that
experience a fall in their terms of trade.  For the country as a whole there is no free lunch.
This result also has important and interesting implications for international trade theory.
Any tit-for-tat  trade war between unequally matched countries (no matter how small the
difference may be) will always  be won by the laryer country. In fact, this result holds for any
asymrnetry between countries that generates  a movement in the terms of trade.  This is a more
general  result than that of Kennan  and Riezman  (1988). They show  that a Nash  trade war
(each country acts as though the other country does not respond to its tariffs)  will only be won
by a sufficiently large country.
Another result  is that increases  in income  taxes  hurt the most  when the economy  is on
the downward-side of the tax revenue (I-affer)  cuwe.  Without loss of generality, we can look
only at household  2 where (p'-  p) = -pr.  Taxes  paid (and rebated)  to this household  are  F  =
(p'-  p)Ei.  The change  in revenue  is
dR,  = (p"  - p)dE:  * (dp" - dp)E:.
Substituting  (20) into (21) yields  the basic  equation
(21)
4"=dR'-dp'E:. (22)
Any increase in r will reduce the net price of good 2 to household 2 when it  sells the
good  in the market, so dpt < 0. Because  household  2 is a net seller  of good  2, its e*cess
demand  for the good is negative,  so the second  term in (22) is negative  (the product of three
10negatives).  This shows  that when there is any  change  in income  taxes,  and taxes  payments  are
rebated  lump-sum,  then welfare  can only increase  if the lump-sum  payment  increases.  In other
words,  increments  in the income  tax hurt the most  when  the economy  is on the downward-side
of the tax revenue function.  If  tax revenues  are maximized, at say,  r  = . 20, then doubling z
from ,05  to .10  will have  a smaller  impact  on welfare  than increasing  r from .20  to .25.
III.  Conclusion
Traditionally,  income taxes have been seen as lowering society's output through the
household's  labor-leisure  tradeoff.  Income  taxes  lower the after-tax  wage  rate and thus
encourago  people to work less  and enjoy  more leisure. This traditional approach,  however,
ignores probably the most important way in which income taxes reduce society's output-by
reducing specialization.  Income taxes discourage  individuals from specializing in activities that
reflect their comparative advantage. They encourage  everyone to avoid taxes and become a
"jack-of-all-trades.'  Indeed it is likely that income taxes  have their most damaging effects not by
causing individuals to work less,  but by causing them to work more in activities where their
talents  do not lie.
As long as it is necessary  to raise revenue, there is really no way to avoid the autarkic
tendencies of income taxes,  sales  taxes,  or VAT  taxes. The only solution would be to minimjze
them by lump-sum supplements  to these anti-specialization taxes. But, as the experience of the
Thatcher government in the United Kingdom illustrates, even small poll taxes are highly
unpopular.  Income taxes are thus likely to remain the primary source of government revenue.
Nevertheless,  we must recognize and fully appraise the damaghg effects that income
taxes  have  on aggfegate  production  and  welfare. With home  production  equal  to one-third of
measured  GDP, the relevant  margin of substitution  for households  is evidently  not only that
11between labor and leisure, but also that between market and non-market forms of labor.  By
focusing on the labor-leisure issue (the slope of "the" labor supply curve) policy makers may
have  grossly  understated  the damaging  effects  which income  taxes  have  on an economy.
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I-tTABLE 1
TARIFF THEORY  VS.  INCOME  TAX THEORY
Tariffs
Different Equations
MRS'= MRT'= p(1  + 11)
MRS,=MRT,-pl(t+t)
Common  Equations




xri  +  px| =crt*Wj
Tt(x,',  x;)  - g
TABLE 2
RECIPROCAI-TARIFF EQUIVALENTS TO INCOME TAXES
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